both critical discourse analysis and linguistic anthropology. Indeed, the examination of the ways in which theoretical concepts, analytical tools, and the very foundations of disciplines are formed, reshaped, or rejected provides crucial information about the general nature of knowledge production in the past, present, and perhaps also in the future. However, the crucial questions "Why this, why now?" and "What is at stake?" need to be asked not only about our data and the themes that are in vogue, but also about the concepts with which we operate.
Introduction
The uneasy relationship between the concepts of discourse and ideology puzzles most scholars in critical language studies at some point in their career. Indeed, why do we have both racist ideologies and racist discourse, whereas we prefer to talk about feminist discourse rather than feminist ideology? And while we can explain language ideologies as "cultural conceptions of the nature, form and purpose of language" (Gal and Woolard 1995: 130) , we cannot define racist ideologies as cultural conceptions of the nature, form, and purpose of racism or race-we would rather define such ideologies as, for instance, misguided cultural conceptions of the nature of humankind. Most of us accept discourse and discourses to be present in all language but many of us consider ideology or ideologies to reside with varying degrees in different discourses. And while we often find discourse to be a concept that is easier to operationalize than ideology when analyzing the data, we prefer ideology as an analytical tool when that data is about language-when we examine language ideologies.
While these concerns typically dissipate as our careers advance, they reappear once in a while when we teach introductory courses. Typically, we then put the problem aside as unsolvable and adopt provisional solutions such as deliberately using both concepts without a clear distinction, or making ad hoc distinctions that work within a clearly defined discipline or only in the cases that are being examined. Sometimes we also argue that such difficulties and transgressive practices are enriching and even empowering: certain paradigms show their strength precisely by contesting normative definitions.
A self-reflective analysis of the researcher's position vis-à-vis the objects of inquiry and the research activity itself is an important component of This file is to be used only for a purpose specified by Palgrave Macmillan, such as checking proofs, preparing an index, reviewing, endorsing or planning coursework/other institutional needs. You may store and print the file and share it with others helping you with the specified purpose, but under no circumstances may the file be distributed or otherwise made accessible to any other third parties without the express prior permission of Palgrave Macmillan. Please contact rights@palgrave.com if you have any queries regarding use of the file.
Contested concepts
Discourse has a long history that should be told and analyzed more often: as the Dictionnaire historique de la langue française and the Trésor de la langue française informatisé (s.v. discourir and discours) inform us, while the verb descorre or discorre is attested in Old French as early as the late twelfth century with the meaning "run around," the noun discours was borrowed from Latin and its first known use in French texts goes back to 1530. In Late Latin already, discours had referred not only to the act of "running around" but also to a "conversation" or a "meeting," metaphorically mimicking the often sinuous nature of oral interactions. The meaning soon broadened to cover a "story" or an "oral or written presentation." Some of today"s linguistic meanings of the term go back to the seventeenth century: in classical linguistic theories discours referred to the linguistic expression of thought and the meaning "succession of words constituting language" has been attested in a text from 1613. This meaning is related also to the term partie du discours, 'part of speech,' attested in French for the first time in 1637. Therefore, when Saussure uses discourse to refer to the result of the process by which the speaker actualizes language (langue) into speech (parole), he is just reiterating deeply rooted meanings: in the English translations of Course in General Linguistics (Saussure 1959: 14, 121; 1983: 14, 123) , discourse refers both to "a speech" and to "language use." Hence, while a generalized usage of the standard notion of discourse as "unit of language larger than a sentence" may well go back to the 1940s, the usage is in fact centuries old, so that when French linguists applied the notion of Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 Simo K. Määttä 65 discourse in the sense of "language put into action" in the 1950s, they did not invent that definition (cf. Sawyer 2002: 434, 436) .
In its everyday usage, discourse can be a relatively neutral term meaning "talk" or "speech" in languages such as French (discours) or Spanish (discurso). In this signification, the reference is therefore rather material. In its current scholarly usage, on the other hand, discourse has a variety of meanings: "chunks of language larger than a sentence," "way of speaking of a particular group or a person," "system of meaning-formation characteristic of a particular social practice," "language as social practice in general," " language-in-action," "language use," etc. (for thorough overviews and discussions of different definitions, see e.g. Maingueneau 2005: 64-72 and Schiffrin 1994: 20-43) . The scholarly meaning is therefore either adjacent to the common-sense usage or quite distinct from it.
As for the concept of ideology, Eagleton (1991: 1-2) lists 16 different definitions: the thousands of monographs carrying "ideology" in their title show that the concept has been analyzed and its history told many times (see Eagleton 1991 and Thompson 1984 for some of the most comprehensive surveys). Like discourse, ideology has a common-sense meaning: "opinions and beliefs of a particular group or a distorted worldview typical of that group." However, ideology cannot have a directly material dimension: rather, its materiality is derived from the semiotic usage that is interpreted as expressing or reifying it. In this common-sense meaning, ideology often has a negative connotation as something that is opposed to truth or to accurate knowledge, which is quite ironic if we consider the history of the notion. Indeed, when late eighteenth-century French ideologue Destutt de Tracy coined the concept, what he had in mind was a positivist science of ideas. But a political connotation and a pejoration arrived quickly: in 1812 Napoleon blamed the ideologues and their "obscure metaphysics" for the debacle he had caused himself, therefore accusing them of precisely the kind of thinking to which they were opposed. The concept of ideology therefore moved from scientific materialism towards the realm of abstract ideas. And when Marx and Engels added the concept to Marx's general theory of alienation (Eagleton 1991: 67-70) , the political dimension became predominant, although positivist aspects continued to lurk in the background. Woolard's (1998) summary of the different ways of understanding ideology exemplifies both positivist and political connotations: "mental phenomena," "reflection and expression of the interests or experience of a specific social position," "signifying practices, ideas, or discourse related to the access to power or to its maintenance," and "distortion or rationalization of reality."
Ideology thus had a loaded political history and a long usage in political and sociological theory when discourse analysis appeared in the latter half of the twentieth century. The way in which the two concepts became intertwined is a complicated narrative that can only be schematized here. In the English-speaking world, discourse analysis started as the analysis of language data above the sentence level and evolved towards definitions emphasizing usage and action. Ideology was not a concern. In France and later in the UK, on the other hand, theories of ideology inherited from Marxist thinking were part of the discourse-analytical enterprise from the very beginning.
French discourse analysis
According to Maingueneau (1991: 9-14) , the emergence of discourse analysis in France was not only a reaction to the inadequacies of North American content analysis: it was a natural continuation of the French and European tradition of philology and textual analysis in an intellectual environment marked by the peak of literary structuralism and the merger of linguistics, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and "Althusserianism," i.e. a popularized version of Althusser's thinking. In this combination of French epistemological tradition and structuralism, it was important to make a distinction between science (reality or truth) and ideology (imaginary deformation of real relations as ideological representations). Discourse analysis, on the other hand, surfaced in this context as perhaps the most promising science of ideology. And since linguistics had created an autonomous object of study for itself, it was the only discipline in the humanities that had made the "epistemological break" from its own ideology into science and could therefore provide solid foundations for a scientific discourse analysis. But the notion of ideology was also related to the unconscious in the Lacanian version of psychoanalysis. Hence, while Zellig Harris's 1952 article on discourse analysis was published in French in 1969, the term analysis, in post-1968 France, was associated not only with linguistic and textual dimensions but also with a technique of reading texts aimed at showing the hidden, unconscious presence of another text, that of ideology, in them.
In early French discourse analysis in particular, the focus was almost exclusively on political texts: all discourse was considered to be political (Maingueneau 1991: 12-13) . The objective of discourse analysis was to expose the ultimate truth about ideologies-mimicking the exactitude of mathematics in some ramifications, such as Pêcheux"s. Foucault Foucault did not define precise analytical tools suitable for a discourse analysis based on the study of language (Maingueneau 1991: 14) and abandoned linguistic considerations in the early 1970s (Mazière 2005: 58) , French discourse analysis today separates itself from traditional linguistic analysis in ways reminiscent of Foucault's (1972) Archeology of Knowledge: while linguistics is concerned with issues such as grammaticality, discourse analysis is interested in determining the modalities of "enunciation" (énonciation)-that which can or cannot be uttered from a particular position. As for the concept of ideology, it more or less merged with discourse, as the definition of discourse as "attestable overdetermination of all individual use of language" (Mazière 2005: 10; my translation) shows.
This partial amalgam of the notions of ideology and discourse appears to originate from Foucault. In The Archeology of Knowledge, published in French in 1969 , Foucault (1972 and passim) defined discourse as a set of statements pertaining to the same discursive formation, governed by the same law of formation, and often corresponding to a particular institution or practice at a given period of time in a given place. Ideology was absent: Foucault preferred not to use that term, for it automatically implies an opposition between ideology and truth, always refers to a subject that is constituted or is being constituted, and is only secondary to that which is material, infrastructural, and economic (Foucault 1980: 118) .
In the 1970s, French discourse analysis evolved towards pragmatics. However, this major theoretical and analytical shift remained largely local due in part to problems related to the translation of key terms. Indeed, it is not easy to render fundamental concepts in the French tradition of pragmatics such as énonciation ('enunciation') and its derivations in other languages (Angermüller 2005) . French discourse analysis today makes a distinction between discourse genres and discourse types. Discourse genres are more or less what people elsewhere call genres (e.g. television news broadcasts, medical consultations, guidebooks). Discourse types pertain to an institutional apparatus (e.g. hospital discourse) or are contingent on a particular positioning (e.g. communist discourse). But appellations such as "postcolonial discourse" or "management discourse" contain elements coming from various discourse types and genres; they are confined by the researcher and need to be historically specified. Somewhat heretically against Foucault and Pêcheux, Maingueneau (2005: 72- 
Critical discourse analysis (CDA)
British cultural-studies theories, based not only on Foucault but among other sources also on Gramsci and the Frankfurt School of critical theory, emphasize the discursive construction of reality, the lack of fixed meanings, and the continuous struggle between discourses over hegemony (see e.g. Laclau and Mouffe 1985) . Sawyer (2002) has argued that the notion of discourse used in Anglo-American social sciences and humanities is based on a number of misreadings of Foucault and erroneous generalizations, and that it originated from British cultural studies and French Marxists and discourse analysts rather than from Foucault. According to Sawyer, Foucault's notion of discourse was first introduced in order to overcome the lack of historicity in cultural studies. But in the 1980s, when discourse had become the token concept, replacing both language and ideology, a "second wave" of Anglo-American scholars gradually attributed their conceptualization of discourse to Foucault retrospectively, although the way they used the term had already been recycled by cultural theorists and therefore did not correspond to the definitions Foucault had given.
However, while Foucault's notion of discourse can be seen as an attempt to avoid both dogmatic structural linguistics and dogmatic Marxism, it not only draws on several previous theorizations of discourse but also incorporates many aspects of existing theories of ideology. In fact, we can read The Archeology of Knowledge as a filter through which diverse ideas circulating in the French intellectual context of the 1960s were dispersed in several directions, including French discourse analysis and British cultural studies. Hence, a somewhat confusing polyphony of meanings and usages was present in The Archeology, and subsequent simplifications and misreadings are due not only to the changes that the concept of discourse experienced over time but also to our natural incapacity to interpret all of the polyphonic layers in texts. Or course, the complexity of Foucault's texts did not help.
And while cultural studies and critical theory certainly had an influence on the genesis of CDA, its conceptualizations of discourse do not appear to be based on just a cursory reading of Foucault. In fact, both Foucault's theorizations of discourse as a practice emanating from an institution and having a tremendous power of materialization, and the old usage reiterated by Saussure-according to which discourse is language put into use-are present in CDA. This epistemology creates the sometimes difficult dual conception of discourse (language as social practice) and discourses (particular linguistic practices related to a field of action or institution). Thus, Fairclough (1995: 92) related to a field of action or institution, so that we have, for instance, economic, organizational, managerial, political, and educational discourses (Fairclough 2002: 164) , and Wodak (2001: 66) conceptualizes discourse as thematically interrelated linguistic acts, realized in texts and genres across different fields of action.
In addition, contrary to later developments in some branches of cultural studies, CDA continues to make a distinction between discourse and ideology. When critical linguistics emerged in the UK, ideology was an essential part of the theoretical constellation (Simpson 1993: 6) ; ideology in fact became a legitimate object of linguistic inquiry (De Beaugrande 1999: 267) . Thus, Hodge and Kress (1993: 6, first published in 1979) argue that all language is ideological and define ideology as "a systematic body of ideas, organized from a particular point of view," systematically distorting reality according to class interests. For the most prominent CDA theorists, on the other hand, while language is "intricately connected with ideological means" and "related to beliefs, opinions and ideologies," language is not ideological per se (Wodak 2007: 1) ; "all types of discourses are [not] ideologically invested to the same degree" (Fairclough 1992: 91) , and "general properties of language and discourse are not, as such, ideologically marked" (van Dijk 2006: 115) .
In CDA, there is indeed both a connection and a distinction between ideology and discourse (see, e.g., Fairclough 1988: 233; van Dijk 2006: 115) . However, "the analysis of ideologies must, and should be, based on ideological presuppositions itself" (Billig 2007: 36) . Thus, when CDA aims at "unmask(ing) ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use," the goal is not to be objective or socially neutral. Indeed, "practitioners of CDA believe that such ostensible political indifference ultimately assists in maintaining an unjust status quo" (Wodak et al. 1999: 7) . Fairclough (1988: 5) also claims that committed research agendas are not only scientific but also unavoidable in any social science research. On the other hand, constant self-reflexivity is needed (Billig 2007: 47; Wodak 2001: 64) , which also implies openness to multiple approaches.
Sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology
In North America, ideology and discourse have had a different history. The importance of philology in linguistics was minor and while many thinkers of the critical school emigrated to the US and were to have a major impact on fields such as literary or cultural studies, their importance for language Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 70 Spanish and Portuguese across Time, Place, and Borders studies in other disciplines was marginal until critical theory started to gain influence within linguistic anthropology in the 1980s. In addition, systemic-functional grammar, which provided a linguistic basis and departure from utterly formalistic linguistics for many CDA approaches, never gained much of a foothold in North America. Discourse studies continued to be conceived of as studies of chunks of language larger than a sentence, although intention is often added to that definition, as exemplified in R. Lakoff's (2000: 8) definition of discourse as "connected language use for a purpose." Indeed, while the French pragmatic turn of discourse analysis consisted of considerations centered on the role, existence, or agency of the subject, Anglo-American pragmatic discourse analysis concentrated on the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects of the speech act.
As Maingueneau (2005: 66-8) notes, defining discourse analysis as the study of elements larger than a sentence or a clause might be due to a desire to appear more respectable and visible within mainstream linguistics as opposed to doing confusing work at the margins. According to him, definitions of linguistic discourse analysis such as " language-in-use" or Schiffrin"s 1994 characterization of discourse as "everyday spoken discourse" would be difficult to apply in disciplines where questions of institutional positioning from which ideologies emanate are at stake. In fact, conversation analysis had a major impact on the development of discourse studies in North America and foundations were sought not only in linguistics and pragmatics but also in anthropology and sociology.
As a result perhaps, while the political aspect has not been rejected altogether, the criticism expressed within sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology has focused mainly on the shortcomings and domination of linguistic formalism and the related notion of linguistic nationalism, perhaps in an attempt to legitimize new conceptions of language that were incompatible with linguistic orthodoxies. Indeed, the birth of sociolinguistics in the 1960s can be seen as a reaction against "the thrust of Chomsky's approach" (Hymes 2000: 312) . Ideology, on the other hand, was largely discarded in traditional forms of sociolinguistics (Labov 1979: 329) , in which relatively stable sociological categories such as community were used without challenging them (Heller 2008: 509-12) , and language was still seen as a regulated system reflecting society or indicating social change (see e.g. Labov 1972: 111) . But as Gumperz and Gumperz-Cook (2008) show, when the agendas of sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropologywhich were historically interrelated, for example, through the importance of ethnography in both-started to merge, focus shifted from community to identity and the political dimension of language. And when critical theory entered linguistic anthropology, all previous concepts were contested. Ideology appeared in this framework of later developments of studies on linguistic relativism and the role of language in the formation of worldview (Blommaert 2005: 171) , first as a rational explanation of analogical linguistic change and a structure tending to regularize usage (Silverstein 1979) . Linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics have strongly emphasized not only the manifestation of language ideologies in a particular language community or nation but also the criticism of Western linguistics, including sociolinguistics. Thus, questioning the ideological foundations of linguistics, Romaine (1994: 12) inquires whether the very concept of a discrete language is a European construct, fueled by literacy and standardization, and whether methodological traditions of linguistic classification rather than the reality of communicative situations guide the identification of distinct languages. Woolard (1998: 25-7) gives a list of linguistics" biases: linguists have constructed languages according to their own discursive practices, exoticized native languages and nonnormative language varieties, and based their theories of language on Western linguistic and cultural ideologies. Cameron (1990: 92) denies a notion of language characterizing it as "an organism or a passive reflection" and appeals for the acknowledgement of its nature as "a social institution, deeply implicated in culture, in society, in political relations at every level."
Ideologies in this linguistic-anthropological sense therefore correspond to Mannheim's (1936: 57-61 ) notion of particular ideologies as instrumental tools of power shaped to the aims and purposes of specific actors. Thus, Kroskrity (2000: 8) argues that "language ideologies represent the perception of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or cultural group."
Comparing the paradigms
CDA and some applied linguistics approaches harder to situate within a paradigm have also criticized linguistics and sociolinguistics. Thus, in his criticism of sociolinguistics, Fairclough (1988: 22) argues that "emphasis should be on language use, but language use conceived as socially determined," i.e. on discourse. Pennycook (1998: 84) contends that although language issues have become politicized, the underlying notion of language has not been questioned; rather, the political component has been added to the existing elements.
But while the agendas of CDA and American linguistic anthropology overlap to a large degree and although similar analytical tools inherited from sociolinguistics and conversational analysis are used, there is not much interaction (Blommaert 2005: 9) . This lack appears to be due at Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 72 Spanish and Portuguese across Time, Place, and Borders least partly to different conceptions of data. On the other hand, the most important hindrance for the different approaches to have a fruitful dialogue resides in divergent definitions of fundamental theoretical concepts.
On a superficial level, the researcher's stance towards his or her own research appears to be the most important difference between CDA and linguistic anthropology: while injustice is the starting point for CDA and the unraveling of discrimination and hidden domination the goal, linguistic anthropology aspires to announce its verdict from a neutral position with the aim of merely describing and explaining. It is therefore not a coincidence that a major object of study of linguistic anthropology has been the concept of language ideology rather than, say, racist ideology. The study of linguistic commodification can be conceived as part of the same evolution of the concentration on the very notion of language.
But there is more and more interaction between the disciplines-the painful distinction between ideology and discourse today is largely due to the clash between concepts coming from different disciplinary traditions and having often incompatible itineraries and histories behind them. In traditional sociolinguistics and pragmatics, discourse is "language put into use" or "chunks of language larger than a sentence" (think of discourse markers). In linguistic anthropology, we encounter a similar theorization of discourse, but also denominations focusing on the function, such as "evaluative discourse" (Kroskrity 2009: 46) . Apart from such conceptualizations of discourse, familiar from conversation analysis (see e.g. Ariel 2009), we also have conceptualizations in which discourse is named on the basis of the topic that circulates within it, such as "discourses of endangerment" (Heller and Duchêne 2007) . Ideologies, on the other hand, appear to be based on a practice, a social institution, or a topic such as "ideologies of storytelling" (Kroskrity 2009 ), "media ideologies" (Gershon 2010) , or language ideologies. Often, however, the distinction between ideology and discourse is not quite clear, as the definitions quoted by Woolard (1998; see section 5.2 of this chapter) show. When such theorizations are used in CDA and (other) paradigms influenced by a cultural-studies reading of discourse and ideology, confusion is inevitable.
Conclusion: operational concepts, essences, and truth or why this now?
In Europe, ethnographic fieldwork was largely confined to disciplines such as dialectology or sociology, whereas CDA and French discourse Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 Simo K. Määttä 73 analysis have centered on texts and discourses emanating from institutions through which the circulation of power is regimented, such as politics, governments, and the media-discourses thought to be particularly ideological, functioning as expression of those ideologies. This textual and linguistic basis or "bias" as well as the concentration on phenomena present in one's own culture have been criticized (e.g. Blommaert 2005: 35, 235) . In the tradition of linguistic anthropology and ethnography of communication, on the other hand, the emphasis has been on "real" language use (conceived as discourse) revealing its secret, including ideologies focusing on a particular concept or activity, through ethnographic data gathering and observation. Besides, the requirement to do research and produce knowledge on phenomena other than those pertaining to one's own culture has been strongly accentuated in the anthropological tradition, which also explains its openness to postcolonial theory.
This conception of ethnography has now entered CDA (see e.g. Krzyż anowski 2011) and European discourse analysis, pushing researchers to identify cases of discourse and (if mostly language is at stake) cases of language ideologies in contexts larger than just written texts. Thus, increased interdisciplinary communication does not prevent practices, such as the search for cases of discourse(s), that people distancing themselves from discourse analysis perceive as fallacious (cf. Blommaert 2005: 236) . In fact, this could be an inevitable outcome of divergent theoretical foundations: different paradigms do not share the same conception of the very nature of language-they are based on different language ideologies. Indeed, depending on the epistemological history of the discipline, ideology and discourse can be contextualized either as theoretical concepts or analytical tools or both. Thus, while linguistic anthropologists may analyze language ideologies in their data consisting of discourse ( language-in-action), critical discourse analysts might want to identify the discourses present in their more or less ideological data consisting of discourse (language as social practice). That is, unless they are analyzing language ideologies, for language ideology has become a token concept across paradigms. Therefore, in a Foucaultian reading, we might as well call these different disciplines or paradigms discourses, for they systematically form, shape, and reshape their concepts and analytical tools and apply them accordingly in their inquiry. As a result, they also find different objects. Maingueneau (1991: 66) notes that the difficulty of defining discourse analysis is related to the spontaneous tendency to base the relationship between discourse and its analysis on the model of the relationship between an empirical object and the disciplines that study it. Statements such as "language is a social practice," as a CDA theorist would say, or "language is a social institution" (Cameron 1990: 93) , can be seen as attempts to overcome the shortcomings of monolithic notions of language. However, the act of saying or writing such a statement constitutes a sort of performative enactment putting language in yet another cage, defining and naming it. Indeed, while such definitions express our will to think of things as processes rather than as beings, the limits of our cognition and the metalanguage that confines us seem to prevent us from grasping all dimensions of language, discourse, and ideology without naming, creating an entity, and essentializing.
The naming of paradigms, theories, and traditions in this essay is a good example of such intellectual limitations. These cognitive patterns make it easier for us to understand the world around us: this is why we study language ideologies or racist ideologies or racist discourses and feminist discourse or hospital discourse rather than just ideology or discourse-both discourses and ideologies appear to be equally essentializable insofar as they are named so that they form an entity. We may well think that things as such do not exist, yet we almost automatically see them as entities and provide them with an essence, therefore reiterating or at least echoing language ideologies according to which language consists of words, and sorting our concepts through theoretical grids reminiscent of Saussurean linguistics and Western scientific tradition in general. This is also visible in the way in which we blame entities such as linguistics, sociolinguistics, the nation state, or capitalism for all kinds of calamities. And when we try to establish a coherent relationship between ideology and discourse, we almost automatically fall into the trap of the two-dimensional, twofold scheme of idealism: intangible ideologies as conditions of existence on the basis of which something is believed to exist, on the one hand, and discourses through which that which exists is materialized, on the other. Hence, things appear to exist only insofar as they are connected to each other and they exist only if correlations in the same conceptual network prove adequate.
Since a word or an expression is perceived as an entity expressing an essence, it makes sense and is endowed with fantastic powers. This is the reason why we not only name but also look for terms that are easy to understand and for terms that are marketable (cf. Billig 2007: 36, 41) . That is, marketable according to the fashions and laws of marketing and branding that are adequate in a given place at a given time. Therefore, the question "Why this now?" is quite relevant in terms of our concept-forming and naming practices as well: why language ideologies, Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 Simo K. Määttä 75 commodification of language, neoliberal discourse, governmentality, etc. now? Why yet another fragmentation of the discipline, on the one hand, why a desired merger of disciplines resulting perhaps inevitably in a hegemonic pattern of knowledge formation leading to uniformity, on the other? These questions should be explored taking into account the discourses and ideologies surrounding and preceding such practices as well as those that they appear to be engendering.
"The eye that knows and decides" is also an eye that governs (Foucault 1973: 89) . A discourse analysis of the reasons why theories and concepts emanate from certain positions and locations (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, rather than, say Spain, India, Brazil, or Nigeria) is in order. In addition, an inquiry of the ways in which each local eye justifies itself as an eye that perceives the truth that other eyes do not see and manages to present itself as the ultimate analyzer of truth carrying positive connotations of progress would be helpful in order to understand the contingent nature of the truth that we seek. In short, we may want to ask ourselves what the regularities are that allow a concept to be part of a network, and perhaps continue to look for other ways of conceptualizing being. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 Proof   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41 
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